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Abstract. - Nowadays there is an increasing interest of physicists in finding regularities related
to social phenomena. This interest is clearly motivated by applications that a statistical mechan-
ical description of the human behavior may have in our society. By using this framework, we
address this work to cover an open question related to elections: the choice of elections candidates
(candidature process). Our analysis reveals that, apart from the social motivations, this system
displays features of traditional out-of-equilibrium physical phenomena such as scale-free statistics
and universality. Basically, we found a non-linear (power law) mean correspondence between the
number of candidates and the size of the electorate (number of voters), and also that this choice
has a multiplicative underlying process (lognormal behavior). The universality of our findings
is supported by data from 16 elections from 5 countries. In addition, we show that aspects of
network scale-free can be connected to this universal behavior.
Introduction. – Social phenomena are nowadays
ubiquitous in the research performed by many physicists.
In these investigations, the human behavior plays a central
role and it constitutes the basic ingredient of the emergent
picture. However, despite the complex scenario related to
human activities, statistical physics models have been suc-
cessfully applied to explain collective aspects of social sys-
tems [1–8]. This success gives rise to the possibility that,
similarly to large-scale physical thermodynamic systems,
large groups of interacting humans may exhibit universal
statistical properties. For the society organization in gen-
eral, this statistical mechanical description of the human
activities seems to be promising in resource management,
service allocation, political strategies, among others.
In this context, aspects related to the formation and
spreading of opinions have attracted great interest. How-
ever, while several models [9] such as the voter [10], Ax-
elrod [11], majority [12] or the Sznajd [13] have been pro-
posed aiming to investigate this scenario, far less attention
has been paid to empirical investigations. An exception
is the electoral process which has been extensively stud-
ied concerning the election results. In fact, Costa Filho et
al. [14] (see also Ref. [15]) reported that the distribution of
votes among candidates for one Brazilian federal election
follows a power law in a limited interval of the number of
votes. Bernardes et al. [16] reproduced this behavior em-
ploying a network model coupled with the Sznajd rule. By
using Brazilian results of federal and local elections Lyra
et al. [17] showed that the distribution of votes is well
adjusted by a generalized Zipf’s law. Gonzalez et al. [18]
found a similar behavior for Indian elections. Travieso and
Costa [19] investigated a network model which qualita-
tively reproduces the distribution profile of votes. Araripe
et al. [20] studied the vote percentage in mayoral elec-
tions taking the number of candidates into account. For
the case of proportional elections Fortunato and Castel-
lano [21] reported that a universality class of vote distribu-
tion emerges when considering the party and the personal
votes. The distribution profile is quite similar to a lognor-
mal and was modelated by a branching process. Correla-
tions and memory were reported by Andresen et al. [22] for
Norwegian polling time series and Herna´ndez-Saldan˜a [23]
investigated the vote distributions for one mexican party.
Araripe and Costa Filho [24] showed that the universality
class of Fortunato and Castellano is not fully verified for
the Brazilian elections. Borghesi and Bouchaud [25] re-
ported a logarithmic decay of the spatial correlations for
turnout rates and winning fraction votes with the distance
among towns. Finally, in a recent article, Araujo et al. [26]
proposed a model to investigate plurality elections.
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Fig. 1: (Color online) Scatter plot of the number of voters N
versus the number of candidates nc on base-10 logarithm scale
for the 2008 Brazilian city council election. The red crosses rep-
resent the empirical data and the green dots are simulation re-
sults obtained from the BA model with c = 1.12, σ = 0.196 and
β = 0.32. The open (filled) circles are the averaged values for
data (simulated results) binned logarithmically and the dashed
line is a linear fit to the data, where we found nc ∼ N
0.36. The
inset shows the same comparison for the variance values σ2
w
.
Naturally, two aspects are essentials in an election: i)
have a prior set of candidates (candidature process) ii)
from which some of them are elected by voters. This last
aspect was investigated in Refs. [14–26]. However, the
candidature process, which is intrinsically related with
the final results of an election since it drastically limits
the choice of voting, has not been investigated yet. In
this letter we fill this hiatus showing that, despite social
or cultural or even psychological characteristics, a robust
regularity emerges. In the following we present our data
set as well as some particularities of each analyzed elec-
tion, the statistical analysis of the data and results from
our model, and our conclusions.
Data presentation and analysis. – As database,
we have 16 elections [27] from Brazil (1996, 2000, 2004,
2008 - mayoral and city council elections), Italy (2010
- mayoral elections), England (2006, 2010 - city council
elections), Canada (2006, 2008 - parliamentary elections),
and Australia (2004, 2007, 2010 - parliamentary elections).
There are 5 mayoral elections, 6 city council elections and
5 national elections. The data are constituted by the num-
ber of candidates in each local political division as well as
the number of voters. In Brazil, general elections are held
every four years and each city votes for executive (mayor)
and legislative (councilor). The executive is composed by
one mayor and the number of legislative representatives
is limited by the size of the local populations. Therefore
we have taken only towns with up to 47600 inhabitants,
for which the number of councilor is 9. They correspond
to 90% (∼ 5000) of the Brazilian cities and the non-use
of this limitation does not affect our results. For the Ital-
ian elections we have only mayoral elections (Provinciali
and Comunali). In the case of English elections, we have
taken the council elections standing in all 624 wards in
the London boroughs, where most of the wards have 3
seats (only 9 wards have a smaller number). In the case
of Canada and Australia the data are from the “House of
Commons” and the “House of Representatives” elections,
each one having 308 and 160 members respectively. In
both cases, the candidates are elected in single-member
elections disputed in each electoral district.
We start by investigating how the number of candidates
(nc) increases with number of voters (N). In Fig. 1 we
show the scatter plot of these two variables taking the
base-10 logarithms for the 2008 Brazilian city council elec-
tion into account. Notice that a clear tendency emerges
suggesting that nc increases with N following a power
law, i.e., nc ∼ N
α. The linear behavior (in a log-log
plot) is evidenced by the Pearson correlation coefficient
r = 0.63. This value of r as well as the scatter plot also
reveals that this power law correspondence is subjected to
fluctuations. A possible method to overcome the fluctu-
ations is constructing windows logarithmically spaced in
N and evaluating the average value of the inside points.
These mean values are also shown in Fig. 1 represented
by open circles and empirical results showed to be very
robust with respect to the number of windows w. Now,
the power law relation becomes evident where we have
〈log10 nc〉 = A + α 〈log10N〉 with the brackets represent-
ing the averages and α = 0.36 for this election.
Figure 2(a) shows these mean values for 5 city coun-
cil elections and Fig. 2(b) does the same for 4 mayoral
and 2 parliamentary elections. Note that we have ploted
these relations discounting the constant value A aiming
to collapse the data. The good quality collapse and the
values of α suggest two classes of universality: one for
single-member elections characterized by α ≈ 0.18 and
another for the city council elections (multi-member elec-
tions) with α ≈ 0.36. The previous result indicates that a
voter also ponders the number of available seats in their
candidature process. However, it is interesting to note
that for London boroughs election there are 3 seats for
each ward while in the Brazilian city council elections 9
seats are disputed and nevertheless the value of the expo-
nent α is approximately the same. This suggests that the
responsibilities of public position have also a central role
in the candidature process since the mayor or parliamen-
tarian functions are in a different plateau of those ones of a
local representative. Moreover, local candidates may have
only a “short-range” popularity restricted to their com-
munity while mayors or a parliamentarians should have a
greater influence.
Let us now address the fluctuation question by first con-
sidering the variance of the logarithm of the number of
candidates σ2w . We evaluate the variance by employing the
same procedure used for the mean values, i.e., constructing
windows logarithmically spaced. Our findings basically in-
dicate that the variance does not depend on N , fact that
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Fig. 2: (Color online) The upper panel shows the mean values of the logarithm of the number of candidates nc vs. number
of voters N discounted the A constant for (a) 5 multi-member elections and (b) 6 single-member elections. The dashed lines
represent the mean value of the exponent α, where we have found α = 0.36 for the multi-member elections and α = 0.18 for
single-member elections. In the bottom panel the fluctuation distributions for (c) the same multi-member elections of Fig.(a)
and in (d) for the same single-member elections of Fig.(b) are showed. The dashed lines are Gaussian PDFs with zero mean
and unitary variance. The different symbols represent the data and the black circles are the predictions of the network model,
considering the BA model with β = 0.32 (β = 0.41) for the multi-member (single-member) election. The other elections present
the same pattern.
can be observed from the inset of Fig. 1. In addition to the
variance, we may also investigate the fluctuations around
the power law mean relation. For this, consider the vari-
able ξ = log10 nc−fw(N)
σw
where fw(N) = A + α 〈log10N〉
represents the function adjusted to averaged values con-
sidering w windows. Figures 2(c) and 2(d) show the prob-
ability distribution function (PDF) of ξ for the same elec-
tions of figures 2(a) and 2(b). From these figures we ob-
serve that ξ follows very close to the standard Gaussian.
Moreover, we also found that, like the mean values, the
distributions does not depend on the number of windows
w.
At this point, it is interesting to summarize our empir-
ical findings through the following expression:
nc = a ζ(t)N
α , (1)
or equivalently log10 nc = log10 a + α log10N + log10 ζ(t)
where log10 a = A and log10 ζ(t) = ξ(t). Here, we use the
variable t to indicate that ζ(t) and ξ(t) are stochastic-like
variables. While ξ(t) is normally distributed, ζ(t) should
be distributed according to a lognormal PDF. Therefore,
Eq.(1) represents a stochastic process where the num-
ber of candidates nc follows a power law mean relation
with N driven by a multiplicative stochastic noise follow-
ing a lognormal PDF. Naturally, simulations using Eq.(1)
are amazingly similar to the empirical ones. It is worth
mentioning that, by averaging this equation, we have
〈log10 nc〉 = A+α〈log10N〉 since 〈log10 ζ(t)〉 = 〈ξ(t)〉 = 0.
A possible direction to go beyond Eq.(1) is to employ
the complex networks formalism [28]. Within this frame-
work, the social agents are represented by nodes in a graph
and the interactions or relationships are expressed by links
among them. In our case, the social agents are the vot-
ers and the connections among them represent a kind of
desire to be a candidate. In a first approximation, we
may directly relate the degree number (number of links)
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to a kind of popularity measure, as more links (large de-
gree) a voter has, the larger their popularity is and, con-
sequently, larger is their probability to be a candidate (see
Fig. 3). Naturally, other networks investigations and mea-
surements could have been employed such as those ones
related to centrality [29] but, as minimal model, we fo-
cus only on the degree distribution p(k). Moreover, it is
reasonable to consider that one voter will becomes a can-
didate if his popularity (degree) exceeds a characteristic
value kc. Consequently, the number of candidates existing
in a given electorate N will be nc ∼ N
∫∞
kc
p(k)dk. At this
point it is interesting to remark that there is no reason the
suppose that p(k) also sensibly depends on N and thereby,
the only way to nc behaves non-linearly is to consider that
the threshold value kc is a function dependent on N . In
fact, regarding our data, we do not have any information
related to the connections existing among the voters in
such way that we can not indicate a specific network to
represent the system.
On the other hand, a remarkable fingerprint of many
social networks is the scale-free distribution of the degree
number, in other words, the distribution of the number
of links (degree) is often well described by a power law
p(k) ∼ k−γ . This universal feature is usually related to
the existence of preferential attachment inside social net-
works [30] and has been found in several social systems
(for examples see table II of Ref. [28]). Thus, in this
context, a scale-free network where p(k) ∼ k−γ sounds
as a natural choice for model our social system. There-
fore, nc ∼ Nk
−γ+1
c and since we empirically know that
nc ∼ N
α, the characteristic value kc should depend on
the number of voters N following another power law, i.e.,
kc ∼ N
β with β = α−11−γ . Of course that candidates are
not always popular persons, since in general there is no
restrictions to be a candidate. In this way, kc may not
be purely deterministic which can be accomplished em-
ploying that kc = c ψσ(t)N
β where c is positive constant
and ψσ(t) is a random number with unitary mean and
standard-deviation σ (negative numbers are avoided). At
this point, it is worth mentioning that other choices for
p(k) will lead to other functional dependences for kc, which
are generally more complicated. For instance, when con-
sidering the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model [31] (or random network)
for which p(k) ≃ e
−〈k〉〈k〉k
Γ(k+1) , kc should be obtained from the
transcendental equation aNα−1 =
∫∞
kc
e−〈k〉〈k〉k
Γ(k+1) dk.
To be more specific, we investigate the above scenario
employing the Baraba´si and Albert [30] scale-free network
(BA model) for which γ = 3 [30, 32]. In our simulations,
we constructed networks where the numbers of nodes are
identical to the empirical values of N and the β values
were obtained directly from the α values. The parame-
ters c and σ should be adjusted for each election by mini-
mizing, for example, the difference between the simulated
and empirical values of the quantities 〈nc〉 and 〈σ
2
w〉, as
we show in Fig. 1. We have found that σ2w is always a
small number (smaller than 1) and for the single-member
Fig. 3: (Color online) A schematic illustration of the network
model: each vertex of the graph represents a voter and the
links among them are the social relationships, e.g., friendships.
One voter ponders his popularity (here, the number of links)
in the community leading or not to the candidature. In this
network, the highlighted nodes are the most popular ones and
consequently potential candidates.
elections this parameter does not need to be considered,
since the intrinsic fluctuations of the BA model are able
to reproduce 〈σ2w〉 and the PDFs, indicating that the BA
model can mimic the multiplicative noise existing in the
data. It is also interesting to note that both parameters
are not important when employing the scaled variables of
Fig. 2(a)-(d). From these figures we can observe that the
model reproduces the scatter plot very well, as well as the
mean values and PDFs.
Summary and Conclusions. – To sum up, we in-
vestigated how the number of candidates (nc) is related
with the number of voters (N) of each electoral dis-
trict. Analyzing data from 16 elections we found that
nc increases with N following a power law mean relation,
nc ∼ N
α. The exponent α was found to be divided in two
classes: α ≈ 0.18 for single-member elections and α ≈ 0.36
for multi-member elections. We have also examined the
fluctuations existing along the average relation revealing
that the candidature is driven by a multiplicative noise
following a lognormal PDF. A scale-free network model
representing the social relationships was employed to re-
produce the data behavior. The model results agree very
well with the empirical data. The findings showed to be ro-
bust in the sense that they are independent of complex sit-
uation related to social and cultural differences among the
countries as well as of individual psychological attributes
of the candidates. This robustness is frequently found in
out-of-equilibrium systems or systems poised at criticality,
where few mechanisms can lead to scale-free statistics and
self-organized criticality [33]. Finally, we believe that our
findings may have implications on the political scene con-
cerning the candidature process. In particular our work
shows that popularity-like measures may depend on the
p-4
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system size.
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